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[42 C.2d 55; 265 P.2d 865]

[L. A. No. 22300. In Bank. Jan. 8, 1954.]

LILIANE CARRE FLYNN, Respondent, v. ERROL
LESLIE FLYNN, Appellant.
[1] Judgments-Merger.-Merger is substitution .of rights and
duties under a judgment or decree· for rights and duties under
the agreement or cause of· action sued on.
[2] Divorce-Judgment---Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in
Decree.-If a separation agreement is .expressly set out in a
divorce decree and court orders that it be performed, a
merger is intended.
[3] !d.-Judgment---Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in Decree.,.....:.Whether or not a merger is intended, a separa,tion agreement may be incorporated into a divorce decree either expressly
or by refe;rence.
[4] Id.-Judgment---Eft'ect of Incorp~ration of Agreement in Decree.-If .a merger is not intended, purpose of incorporation
of a separation agreement into a divorce decree will be only
to identify agreement so as to render its validity res judicata
in any subsequent action based on it.
[5] ld.---'Jndgnient---Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in Decree,,-If a merger is intended, purpose of incorporation of a
separation agreement into a divorce decree is to make agreement an operative part of decree.
[6] !d.-Judgment---Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in Decree.-While in absence of an express order to perform all or
part of a separation agreement it may be difficult to determine
whether or not merger with a divorce decree . was intended,
there can be no doubt as to intent of parties and court that
a merger should occur where decree expressly provides that
agreement "is hereby specifically incorporate.d herein and
made a part of this decree, and . defendant is hereby ordered
to make all of the payments provided therein to be paid by
him."
[7] Judgments-Incorporation of Documents.---'A document may
be incorporated either expressly or by apt reference in:to a
judgment or decree so as to make it an operative part of order
of court.
[2] See Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 624.
McK. Dig. References: [1] ".Judgments, § 342; [2~6, .10, 11) Divorce, §122.; [7, 8] Judgments, § 85; [9] Divorce, § 260; [12, 13]
Divorce, § 216(1).
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[8] !d.-Incorporation of Documents.-A document may be effectively incorporated in a judgment or decree by reference though
it is not part of permanent records of court and though it is
merely introduced in evidence as an exhibit and hence could
be withdrawn or destroyed, where such is its clearly expressed
intent.
[9] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings.Greater certainty and clarity may be required to support contempt proceedings than are necessary to support other judgment remedies or establish a separation agreement as part of
order of divorce court for modification purposes.
[10] !d.-Judgment-Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in Decree.-In cases in which it is difficult or impossible accurately
to determine from permanent records of court alone the intended character of payments involved in separation agreement
incorporated in divorce decree, courts may properly consider
all of admissible extrinsic evidence to interpret their decrees.
[11] !d.-Judgment-Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in Decree.-A divorce decree may be given its intended effect by referring to an adequately identified document, and the fact that
such document is not a part of permanent records of court does
not vitiate decree. (Disapproving Price v. Price, 85 Cal.App.2d
732, 194 P.2d 101.)
[12] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-Where property settlement incorporated by reference in interlocutory divorce decree is an integrated bargain, monthly payments for support and maintenance of wife may not be modified contrary to its terms.
[13] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-\Vhere property settlement agreement incorporated by reference in interlocutory divorce decree
provides that husband shall make payments totaling $18,000
per year or 10 per cent of his gross income as therein defined,
whichever is less, but in no event is he to pay less than $9,000
per year unless his gross income falls below $90,000 per year
and so continues for a period of one year or more, for any
reason except his wilful refusal or neglect to seek, obtain or
accept employment, and if his income does fall below $90,000
per year for other than excepted reasons and so continues for
a year or more, the agreement provides that he may petition
court in divorce action to reduce payments until his income
again rises to $90,000 or more, court has jurisdiction to modify
payments only in accordance with agreement .

•

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denying motion to modify terms of a property
settlement agreement incorporated in a j rrdgment of divorce.
Elmer D. Doyle, Judge. Affirmed.
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Jerry Giesler and Robert E. Ford for Appellant.
Loeb & Loeb, Herman F. Selvin and Harry L. Gershon for
Respondent.
TRA. YNOR, J.-On October 11, 1941, plaintiff Liliane
Carre Flynn and her husband, defendant Errol Flynn, executed a separation agreement providing fo~on of
their community property and the support and maintenance
of plaintiff and the minor child of the parties. The agreement also provided that in any action for divorce brought
by either party ''this agreement may be approved by [the]
court and that the terms and provisions hereof may be made
and become a part of and incorporated in any decree which
may be made by such court, and the parties ordered to comply
with the provisions hereof.'' In 1942, plaintiff was awarded
a divorce from defendant, and the interlocutory decree provided that ''The property settlement agreement between the
parties hereto dated October 11, 1941 and received in evidence herein, is hereby ratified, approved and confirmed and
the same is hereby specifically incorporated herein and made
a part of this decree, and defendant is hereby ordered to
make all of the payments provided therein to be paid by
him, at the times and in the manner therein provided, and
plaintiff and defendant are hereby ordered to comply in all
respects with each and all of the terms and provisions of
said agreement and to perform all their obligations thereunder as therein provided.'' The final judgment incorporated
the foregoing provision of the interlocutory decree by reference.
In 1950 defendant petitioned the court to order a reduction in the monthly payments provided in the agreement
on the ground of changed circumstances. In October, 1951,
the court entered its order denying defendant's motion on
the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the interlocutory decree because the property settlement agreement
was incorporated by reference only. Defendant has appealed.
Defendant contends that the quoted provision of the interlocutory decree merged the agreement into the decree and
that therefore the court had continuing jurisdiction under
section 139 of the Civil Code to modify the provisions for
support and maintenance. Plaintiff contends, on the other
hand, that since the agreement was incorporated by reference
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only, a merger did not occur, and that in any event modification was precluded by the terms of the agreement.
[1] Merger is the substitution of rights and duties under
the judgment or the decree for those under the agreement
or cause of action sued upon. (See Rest., Judgments, § 47,
Comment a; Hmtgh v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 610 [160
P.2d 15]; Timrn v. McCartney, 30 Cal.App.2d 241, 248 [85
P.2d 920].) The question as to what extent, if any, a merger
has occurred, when a separation agreement has been presented
to the court in a divorce action, arises in various situations.
Thus, it may be necessary to determine whether or not contempt will lie to enforce the agreement, whether or not
other judgment remedies, such as execution or a suit on the
judgment, are available, whether or not an action may still
be maintained on the agreement itself, and whether or not
there is an order of the court that may be modified under
the provisions of section 139 of the Civil Code.
In any of these situations it is first necessary to determine
whether the parties and the court intended a merger. [2] If
the agreement is expressly set out in the decree, and the court
orders that it be performed, it is clear that a merger is
intended. (Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 158, 165
[124 P.2d 5]; Lazar v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 617, 620
[107 P.2d 249] .) On the other hand, the parties may intend
only to have the validity of the agreement established, and
not to have it become a part of the decree enforceablfi as
such. (See Plwrnrner v. Superior Cottrt, 20 Cal.2d 158, 164
[124 P.2d 5]; Howarth v. Howarth, 81 Cal.App.2d 266, 272
[183 P.2d 670] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal.App.2d 676, 685
[40 P.2d 536]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal.App. 363, 368
[17 P.2d 749] .) [3] Whether or not a merger is intended,
the agreement may be incorporated into the decree either
expressly or by reference. [4] If a merger is not intended,
the purpose of incorporation will be only to identify the
agreement so as to render its validity res judicata in any
subsequent action based upon it. (Howarth v. Howarth,
81 Cal.App.2d 266, 272 [183 P.2d 670]; Baxter v. Baxter,
3 Cal.App.2d 676, 685 [40 P.2d 536]; see Queen v. Queen,
44 Cal.App.2d 475, 479, 482 [112 P.2d 755] .) [5] If a
merger is intended, the purpose of incorporation is, of course,
to make the agreement an operative part of the decree.
['6] In the absence of an express order to perform all or
part of the agreement, it may be difficult to determine whether
or not a merger was intended. (See Plummer v. Superior
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Court, 20 Cal.2d 158, 165 [124 P.2d 5] ; Lazar v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal.2d 617, 620 [107 P.2d 249]; 1 .Armstrong,
California Family Law, pp. 423-427; cf., Kent v. Superior
Court, 106 Cal..App.2d 593, 595-596 [235 P.2d 420]; Young
v. Superior Court, 105 Cal..App.2d 65, 66-67 [233 P.2d 39] ;
Shogren v. Superior Court, 93 Cal..App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d
108] .) In the present case, however, there can be no doubt
as to the intent of the parties and the court that a merger
should occur. Thus, the decree provided that the agreement
"is- hereby specifically incorporated herein and made a part
of this decree, and defendant is hereby ordered to make all
of the payments provided therein to be paid by him. . . . ''
Once it is determined that a merger was intended, it is
necessary to decide whether the decree has the requisite formalities to permit its enforcement in place of the agreement
it was intended to supersede. [7] It is settled that a document may be incorporated either expressly or by apt reference into a judgment or decree so as to make it an operative
part of the order of the court. (Fecleml Farm Mtg. Corp. v.
Sandberg, 35 Cal.2d 1, 3 [215 P.2d 721] ; Title Ins. Co. v.
Miller,& Lux, Inc., 183 Cal. 71, 89, 90 [190 P. 433] ; Horton
v. Winbigler, 175 Cal. 149, 158-159 [165 P. 423]; Hogue v.
Fanning, 73 Cal. 54, 57 [14 P. 560] ; Kelly v. McKibben, 54
Cal. 192, 193-194; Kittle v. Lang, 107 Cal..App.2d 604, 612
[237 P.2d 673] ; Petry v. Super'iOJ' Court, 46 Cal..App.2d 756,
760 [116 P.2d 954]; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal..App. 485, 488
[289 P. 645] .) [8] Plaintiff contends, however, that a document may not effectively be incorporated by reference unless
it is part of the permanent records of the court. She points
out that since in this case the agreement was merely introduced in evidence as an exhibit, it could be withdrawn or
destroyed, and that therefore interested parties could not by
searching the records of the court "construct a complete picture of the rights and obligations of the parties." (See Price
v. Price, 85 CaL~pp.2d 732, 735 [194 P.2d 101] .) These
considerations may justify modifying the interlocutory decree
on appeal to require that the agreement be attached to the
decree. \Ve do not believe, however, that they are sufficient
to require us to hold that the decree, now final, is insufficient
to effect its clearly stated intent.
It is unne~cessary to decide whether the fact that the agreement was incorporated by reference only prevents its enforcement by contempt proceedings. (See Shogren v. Superior
Court, 93 Cal..App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d 108]; cf., City of
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v·ernon v.
Court, 38 Ca1.2d 509, 513-514 [241 P.2d
243] .)
Greater certainty and clarity may be required
to support such
than are necessary to support
other judgment rrmedies or establish the agreement as part
of the order of the court for modification purposes. (See
Pl~tmrrte1~ v.
Cmcrt, 20 Ca1.2d 158, 164-165 [124
P.2d 5]; 39 Cal.L.llev. 250, 252.) Moreover, we are not here
concerned with the rights of third parties who may have dealt
with plaintiff or defendant IYith respect to the specific property covered by the
in ignorance of its terms. \Ve
are concerned only with the provisions of the agreement providing for monthly payments in litigation between the parties
themselves. Under these circumstances, the necessity of referring to an extrinsic document presents no insuperable barrier
to giving effect to the decree, as is demonstrated by the many
cases where the court in modification proceedings has taken
extrinsic evidence to determine whether the provision for
monthly payments was one for alimony subject to modification or part of a property settlement not subject to modification. (See, e. g., Tuttle v. Tuttle, 38 Cal.2d 419, 420-422
[240 P.2cl 587] ; Codorniz v. Codoniiz, 34 Cal.2d 811, 815
[215 P.2cl 32] .) [10] Thus, in cases in which it is difficult
or impossible accurately to determine from the permanent
records of the court alone the intended character of the payments involved, courts do not hesitate to consider all of the
admissible extrinsic evidence correctly to interpret their
decrees. Certainly no greater difficulties are presented by permitting reference to an extrinsic document to give effect to
the clearly expressed intent of the decree. [11] Thus in
this case, the decree may be given its intended effect by referring to an adequately identified document, and the fact
that the document is not a part of the permanent records
of the court does not vitiate the decree. (Goat man v. F~tller,
191 Cal. 245, 251 [216 P. 35] ; De Sepulved.a v. Baugh, 74
Cal. 1168, 474 [16 P. 223, 5 Am.St.Rep. 455]; Kittle v. Lang,
107 Cal.App.2d 604, 612 [237 P.2d 673]; JJicLean v. Ladewig,
2 Cal.App.2d 21, 25-26 [37 P.2d 502]; see, also, Newport v.
Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 156 [231 P. 987]; Rosenthal v.JJf.atthews,
100 Cal. 81, 83 [34 P. 624] .) Price v. Price, 85 Cal.App.2d
732 [194 P.2d 101], is contrary to the foregoing authorities
and is disapproved.
[12] An examination of the property settlenient incorporated by reference in the interlocutory decree makes clear that
it is an integrated bargain of the type considered in Dexter v.
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Dexter, ante, p. 36 [265 P.2d 873], and Fox v. Fox,
ante, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881]. Accordingly, the provision for monthly payments may not be modified contrary to
its terms. [13] The agreement provides that defendant shall
make payments totaling $18,000 per year or 10 per cent of
his gross income as therein defined, whichever is less. In
no event, however, is he to pay less than $9,000 per year unless
his gross income falls below the sum of $90,000 per year
and so continues for a period of one year or more, for any
reason except his wilful refusal or neglect to seek, obtain
or accept employment. If his income does fall below $90,000
per year for other than the excepted reasons and so continues
for a year or more, the agreement provides that he may petition the court in the divorce action to reduce the payments
until his income again rises to $90,000 a year or more. Since
the parties have provided that the court may modify the
payments ordered pursuant to the terms of their agreement,
the court has jurisdiction to do so in accordance with the
agreement. (Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733, 740
[72 P.2c1 868] ; Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 625, 628 [206
P. 79] ; see Fox v. Fox, ante, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881] .) At
the time the order was entered in this case, however, the
record indicates that, although defendant had been unable
to work for several months, his income had not remained
below $90,000 for one year, and therefore an order reducing
the payments would have been improper. He may renew his
motion for a reduction in the monthly payments in accordance
with the terms of the property settlement agreement any
time the facts so justify.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
SCHAUER, ,J.-I concur in the judgment. I do not agree
that by the mere fiat of a declaration in a judgment, when
upon the face of the judgment itself the falsity of the declaration is manifest, this court or anyone else is bound, or even
entitled, to accept the falsity as verity.
The statement in the decree in this case that "The property
settlement agreement between the parties hereto ... is hereby
specifically incorporated herein and made a part of this decree" undoubtedly was intended to be verity but the most
casual inspection of the entire judgment (or the judgment
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roll) discloses that in truth the agreement IS not "incorporated'' therein or ''made a part'' thereof. ''In no case
is a judgment effectual for any purpose until entered.''
(Code Civ. Proc., § 664.) To enter a judgment means to
copy it in the "judgment book" so that it becomes a permanent and public record (see Code Civ. Pro c., § 668), so that
he who reads may know its content. Any portion of a judgment not entered in the judgment book would be ineffectual
for any purpose. If the clerk by error omitted to enter any
part of a judgment which had been filed, the error of the
. ministerial officer could be corrected; but if he has performed
his duty and the judgment as entered is truly the judgment
as rendered, and that judgment has become final, then neither
this court nor any other court or person has power to add
words to the language of that judgment.
Neither do I agree with implications in the majority opinion
that a court may arbitrarily disregard the whole or any
portion of a property settlement agreement which has been
fairly executed. Husband and wife are competent to contract
with each other in respect to property rights to the same
extent "which either might if unmarried." ( Civ. Code,
§§ 158, 159.) When divorce is contemplated, public policy
favors the settlement of property rights by agreement. The
most basic rules governing freedom to contract and the integrity of contracts require that agreements between competent parties, fairly entered into and with a good considt-ration, be respected.
The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
affirmance of the order, but dissent as to some of the reasoning set forth in the majority opinion.
In the case at bar, the interlocutory decree provided that
''The property settlement agreement between the parties
hereto dated October 11, 1941, and received in evidence herein,
is hereby ratified, approved and confirmed and the same is
hereby specifically incorporated herein and made a part of
this decree, and defendant is hereby ordered to make all of
the payments provided therein to be paid by him, at the
times and in the manner therein provided, and plaintiff and
defendant are hereby ordered to comply in all respects with
each and all of the terms aud provisions of said agreement
and to perform all their obligations thereunder as therein
provided.'' This provision of the interlocutory decree was
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incorporated in the final judgment by reference. In the
majority opinion it is held that the agreement entered into
between the parties was an integrated property settlement
agreement which could not be modified by the court in the
absence of another agreement between the parties. With this
holding I agree. I do not agree that the paragTaph above
quoted is sufficient to merge the agreement into the interlocutory decree of divorce.
I am also of the opinion that if the decree does not embody
the agreement either in substance or in haec verba, it is not
an operative part of it and may not be enforced as a part of
the decree. 'l'his is true even though the agreement may have
been introduced in evidence and approved by the court. If
the agreement is merely introduced in evidence as an exhibit,
as it undoubtedly was here, it could be withdrawn or destroyed
and interested parties could not, by searching the records
of the court ''construct a complete picture of the rights and
obligations of the parties" (Price v. Price, 85 Cal.App.2d 732,
735 [194 P.2d 101] ).
In Howarth v. Howarth, 81 Cal.App.2d 266 [183 P.2d 670],
the question was whether an action for support money would
lie on an agreement for support where the court granting the
divorce decree (Utah) approved the agreement but did not
embody it in the decree. It was held that an action would
lie on the agreement but not the decree. (See, also, Taylor
v. Taylor, 39 Cal.App.2d 518 [103 P.2d 575]; Ro'bertson v.
Robertson, 34 Cal.App.2d 113 [93 P.2d 175] ; Ross v. Ross,
1 Cal.2d 368 [35 P.2d 316] .) It should be obvious that where
the agreement has not been properly embodied in the decree
but the court purports to order performance of it and makes
no other provision for support or division of property, it either
has not passed upon the questions of support, or has, in effect,
denied alimony. Indeed, where a decree has made no provision for alimony, the court cannot later modify it to provide
for alimony. This is true unless the court in some authorized manner has reserved jurisdiction to do so. (Estate of
B1·ooks, 28 Cal.2d 748 [171 P.2d 724]; Monroe v. Superior
Cma·t, 28 Cal.2d 427 [170 P.2d 473]; Long v. Long, 17 Ca1.2d
409 [110 P.2d 383]; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 130 Cal. 409 [62 P.
598] ; Howell v. Howell, 104 Cal. 45 [37 P. 770, 43 Am.St.Rep.
70].) The mere confirmation or approval of the agreement
without embodying it in the decree, at most, determines that
the agreement is valid and may be enforced in a separate
action between the parties. (Price v. Price, 85 Cal..App.2d
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732 [194 P.2d 101] .) If the agreement is an integrated property settlement agreement, or if it is a valid agreement entered
into between the spouses for the support and maintenance
of one of them, it may not, even if embodied in the decree,
be modified without the consent of both parties. (See Fox v.
Fox, ante, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881] ; Dexter v. Dexter, ante,
p. 36 [265 P.2d 873] .)
A separation agreement, whether it involves property rights
or support allowances, or both, has not been embodied in the
decree for the purpose of merger, or enforcement by contempt
proceedings unless it is set forth in full, or in substance, in
the decree itself or is physically attached to the decree and
expressly made a part thereof by the language of the decree
and compliance with its terms is ordered by the decree. As
was said in Price v. P1·ice, supra: '' . . . there is a difference
for if there is an actual incorporation of the agreement into
the decree, the decree standing alone then carries within itself
the complete measure of the rights and obligations of the
parties. In the court's files, the decree or judgment itself
supplies all the information necessary to whomsoever may be
intere::;ted. If recorded it announces to the world the respective interests of the parties in any property involved.
''If on the other hand the agreement is made a part of
the decree by reference .only the above is not true. One searching the file could not construct a complete picture of the
rights and obligations of the parties from the decree or judgment alone. Reference might be to an exhibit attached to a
pleading, to another judgment, or even to an agreement offered
in evidence and withdrawn and not available as a part of
any public record. In such a case it would not follow that
the value attaching to such an unincorporated document would
be 'only historical.' It or a true copy thereof would of necessity have to be sought out and produced in order to determine
what the complete judgment actually provided. If it could
not be produced, or its terms definitely established, then that
part of the judgment represented by it could not be enforced.
In particular it could not be enforced by contempt proceedings." (Emphasis added.) In the majority opinion, it is
said that the Price case, being contrary to the following
authorities ( Goatman v. lhdler, 191 Cal. 245, 251 [216 P. 35] ;
De Sepulveda v. Baugh, 74 Cal. 468, 474 [16 P. 223, 5 Am.
St.Rep. 455]; Kittle v. Lang, 107 Cal.App.2d 604, 612 [237
P.2d 673]; McLean v. Laclewig, 2 Cal.App.2d 21, 25-26 [37
P.2d 502] ; Newport v. Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 156 [231 P.

.Jan.1954]

FLYNN v. FLYNN
[42 C.2d 55; 265 P.2d 865]

65

; Rosenthal v.
100 Cal.
83
P. 624]),
is disapproved.
In Goatrnan v. lhiller, s?tpra, an erroneous description of
certain real property involved in a lease was carried over into
the findings and judgment in an action on the lease. The
trial court granted plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint,
findings and judgment mtnc pro tunc to give the correct description. The court there said: "Moreover, it is not questioned that the description of the land originally contained
in the judgment is erroneous. Therefore, the only effect of
a reversal of the order would be to remit respondents to an
action in equity, in which they clearly would be entitled to
have the judgment amended. (Y mmg v. Fink, 119 Cal. 107
l50 Pac. 1060]; In re McGrew, supra [183 Cal. 177 (190 P.
804)] .) To obviate any such further proceedings, let the
order be affirmed.''
In De Septtlvecla v. Baugh, sttpra, a quiet title action was
involved. A. certain tract was described by metes and bounds
with an exception which was described as being recorded in
certain numbered books, on certain numbered pages, in the
records of Los Angeles County. 'rhe court there held that
while the description was not an ''ideal'' one, it was not
uncertain or doubtful and that the judgment was not "void."
The reference here was to public records.
In Newport v. Hatton, supra, an action to establish the
right of plaintiffs in certain land and to the proceeds of the
sale thereof was involved. The question was which 75 acres
of the south half of a certain quarter section was involved.
'fhere the court refused to declare the judgment a nullity
because of the defective description and said that whether or
not the description was defective must be tested by rules of
evidence applied ordinarily to the subject.
In Rosenthal v. Matthews, supra, another description of
land was involved. 'l'he complaint definitely and correctly
described the premises; the judgment described it correctly
but excepted from its effect certain parts of the land ''as
were sown to grain by the defendant during the fall of 1890
and the winter of 1891." The court held that the land could
be identified by extraneous evidence ''as in cases of the
removal or destruction of stakes or other monuments called
for in deeds and patents.''
In McLean v. Ladewig, St(,pra, a quiet title action was
involved. It was held there that when property is well de42 C.2d-3
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scribed by name, a conveyance by that designation is sufficient
and a subsequent particular description could not be held to
be used in the sense of restriction.
In Kittle v. Lang, snpra, it was said: "It is true that findings, as well as the judgment based thereon, should be defin~te
and certain. .At least they should be sufficiently clear and
definite to enable a party to comply with their requirements .
. . . The judgment here involved is merely an order to the
defendant to turn over to plaintiff such part of the personal
property assets of the partnership now in defendant's possession as are described in Exhibit I, which exhibit is made
a part of the findings and judgment by reference. Defendant
admitted he still had in his possession much of this equipment
but claimed title to it under the terms of the quitclaim deed,
which deed the court found was ineffective as to this particular
personal property.
''As between the parties to this action, we believe the findings and judgment, in this respect, are sufficiently clear and
definite to enable defendant to comply with its requirements."
It is quite apparent that the Kittle case is the only one
of these at all like the case at bar or the Price case which has
been erroneously disapproved. In all the others, defective
descriptions of real property 1vere involved and, in all of them,
it was possible to make certain the deficiency. In a divorce
action where the property settlement agreement of the parties
is not sufficiently incorporated into the interlocutory and final
decrees, an action may still be brought on the agreement itself
but, in my opinion, may not be brought to enforce the judgment because there is nothing in the judgment to enforce. It
is also apparent that a majority of this court really believes
that the agreement was insufficiently incorporated in the decree, for they say : '' 'rhese considerations may justify modifying the interlocutory decree on appeal to require that the
agreement be attached to the decree. \Ve do not believe,
however, that they are sufficient to require us to hold that
the decree, now final, is insufficient to effect its clearly stated
intent."
This case adds a great deal to the confusion which has
heretofore existed as to what constitutes an incorporation.
To say that the facts here present a sufficient incorporation
and then to say that the interlocutory decree, which is now
final, may be modifiecl on appeal to require attachment of the
ag1·eement thereto is the height of absurdity. It also is an
effective trap designed to catch both wary and unwary attor-
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neys who are trying to honestly and conscientiously protect
their clients' interests. Under the holding here, it is absolutely
impossible for attorneys to know whether this court will,
years later, determine that there was an incorporation, or
order one whether or not it was intended at the time of the
interlocutory decree.
In my opinion there was no incorporation here.
The proper rule and the rule which should prevail is that
a valid agreement between husband and wife fixing the right
of support or alimony following divorce, even though it is
not integrated with a property settlement, cannot be altered
by the court in the ensuing divorce action, or, if incorporated
in the decree, the latter may not be modified, unless the agreement so provides. Such an agreement may, of course, be
disregarded if it is tainted with fraud or there is overreaching.
However, after merger in the decree, the decree is not subject
to modification except to the extent that ordinary judgments
are subject to attack. This is the logical result which flows
from Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2c1 621 [177 P.2d 265]. We
there held that separation agreements in which the support
and maintenance provisions are so interwoven that they constitute a part of a division of the property of the parties,
and thus not in the nature of alimony, are not subject to
modification either before or after merger except as mentioned
in the above stated rule. It was said in the Adams case
(p. 624) that: "Property settlement agreements occupy a
favored position in the law of this state and are sanctioned
by the Civil Code. (Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 89 [142 P.2c1
417]; Hensley v. Hensley, 179 Cal. 284, 287 [183 P. 445];
Civ. Code, §§ 158, 159.) Such agreements are usually made
with the advice of counsel after careful negotiations, and
the courts, in accord with legislative sanction, prefer agreement rather than litigation. (Hill v. Hill, supra at p. 89.)
"When the parties have finally agreed upon the division of
their property, the courts are loath to disturb their agreement
except for ~.quitable considerations. A property settlement
agreement, therefore, that is not tainted by fraud or compulsion or is not in violation of the confidential relationship
of the parties is valid anil binding on the court. (Hough v.
Hmlgh, 26 Ca1.2d 605, 614 [160 P.2d 15]; Estate of Belknap,
66 Cal.App.2d 644, 651-652 [152 P.2c1 657] ; Baxter v. Baxter,
3 Cal.App.2d 676, 681 [40 P.2d 536]; Brown v. Brown, 83
Cal.App. 74, 82 [256 P. 595]; McCahan v. McCahan, 47 Cal.
App. 176,183 [190 P. 460] .)
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'' . . The contract may even provide solely for support
and maintenance without reference to a division of property.
These contracts, if equitable, are enforceable even though not
""~'Pnti><J to the court in a divorce action.'' Those principles
were stated as to "property settlement agreements," yet they
are equally
to agreements for alimony. It is true
that agreements
property rights are specifically authorized
the statute but the same is also true as to agreements for alimony. Section 158 of the Civil Code provides that:
"Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or
transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which either might if unmarried." Section 159
reads: ''A lmsband and wife cannot, by any contract with
each
alter their legal relations, except as to property,
and
that they may agree, in writing, to an immediate
separation, and may make provision for the support of either
of them and of their children during such separation."
(Emphasis added.) And further indicating the propriety of
such agreements, section 175 provides: ''A husband abandoned
his wife is not liable for her support until she offers
to
unless she was justified, by his misconduct, in
abandoning· him; nor is he liable for her support when she
is living separate from him, by agreement, unless such support
is stipulated in the agreement." Sueh agreements are enforceable and binding upon the parties, if equitable, even
though not presented to the court in the divorce action.
(Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Cal.2d 621, 624; Sanborn v.
Sanborn, 3 Cal.App.2d 437 [39 P.2d 830]; Brown v. Brown,
83 Cal.App. 74 [256 P. 595].)
There are cases that hold or state that the incorporation
of a support agreement in the divorce decree does not prevent
the modification of the decree. (See Adams v. Adams, sttpra,
29 Cal.2d 621; Ho~tgh v. Hough, snpra, 26 Cal.2d 605; Ptwkett
v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833 f136 P .2d 1] ; and cases cited in
those
Those cases are based on the theory that the
court in an action for divorce has general power over alimony
and that such power cannot be taken away by agreement of
the parties as to alimony either when considering the question
in the divorce action, or in considering the question of modification of the decree, where the agreement has been incorporated in the deeree, because it has power to determine fault
npon which an award of
may depend ( Civ. Code,
§ 139) ; and that there is a public policy against the possibility that the care of the spouse will become a public charge
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where the agreement does not make
In
regard to permanent
section 139 of the Civil Code
provides that when the divorce is
for an offense of
the husband, the court "may" provide for the wife's support
by him and ''may'' modify its orders on that subject. The
court "may" require the payment of temporary alimonysupport during the pendency of the action. ( Civ. Code,
§ 137.) It will be noted that the authority of the court is
stated in permissive rather than mandatory language. 'l'he
wording does not exclude the propriety of the parties contracting on the subject or the court being bound by the contract.
Those sections must be read in conjunction with section 159,
s1tpra, which expressly authorizes those contracts. It is not
to be supposed that the Legislature would expressly authorize
those contracts and at the same time leave it to the whim or
caprice of the divorce court whether any effect was to be
given to them. The right of freedom of contract given by
section 159, supra, certainly eliminates any argument that a
married woman is not competent to contract or that she needs
any protection by the court that is not afforded to other
contracting parties. Moreover, it must be noted that the
court in the divorce action is given the authority to divide
the community property of the spouses according to various
fault factors ( Civ. Code, § 146, which provides that community
property "shall" be assigned as there set forth), yet it is
held by a legion of cases that a contract dividing such property when presented to the court in the divorce action is .
binding: j)!l the court. (Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Cal.2d
6!h, a:r;d cases cited supra.) The same construction should
be given to sections 137 and 139 of the Civil Code. It is
true that nothing is said in section 146, as there is in section
139, about modifying the property division orders of the
court, which is understandable because that is done by one
act and does not involve the doing· of a series of acts in the
future like monthly payments for support, and I am referring
to the holdings that the property division contract is binding
on the court when p1'esented in the divorce action. The fact
that the code sections authorize giving consideration to fault
of the parties in the award of alimony requires no different
result because the same is true of a community property
division, and as the parties are free to contract as to support
( Civ. Code, § 159, supra), they may in their negotiations give
consideration to that factor. I would hold, therefore, that
there is nothing in the Civil Code sections discussed which
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prevents giving effect to a purely support contract, nor which
makes the decree subject to modification when the contract
is merged therein.
The policy factors are not persuasive. The statute (Civ.
Code, § 159) expressly declares the policy that the parties may
contract on this subject. If ~hey may, effect should be given
to their contracts. Being fully advised, they have made
their choice on the question of support. Having made the
arrangement, they are entitled to have it be given stability
in order that each may arrange his future affairs with some
degree of certainty. If future contingencies might alter the
situation they may provide for them in their contracts. Indeed,
terms in the contract giving flexibility to it would be desirable and easily achieved. Courts do not make new contracts
or disregard contracts which the parties have made on a
subject concerning which they may lawfully contract: (6 Cal.
,Jur. 326 et seq.)
Of course, the parties need not contract unless they desire
to do so. They may leave the determination to the court.
If they do contract but do not present it to the court in the
action and the court makes a determination on the subject of
support, then they have waived the contract as fixing their
rights and obligations; the decree then is the measure of their
rights and duties. If the contract is presented to the court
and is approved but not embodied in the decree as heretofore
described, then their remedy is on the contract and not the
deeree. Such is the case at bar.

